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Abstract We present an experiment investigating the effects of singling out an indi-
vidual on trust and trustworthiness. We find that (a) trustworthiness falls if there is a
singled out subject; (b) non-singled out subjects discriminate against the singled out
subject when they are not responsible of the distinct status of this person; (c) under a
negative frame, the singled out subject returns significantly less; (d) under a positive
frame, the singled out subject behaves bimodally, either selecting very low or very high
return rates. Overall, singling out induces a negligible effect on trust but is potentially
disruptive for trustworthiness.
1 Introduction
We present the results of an experiment to test the effect of singling out an individual
on trust and trustworthiness. The act of singling out an individual from a group based
on his or her socio-economic categories (e.g. gender, race, age, income, political view)
is a pervasive phenomenon of economic and social life. It occurs whenever a subject,
who has specific attributes that make him or her potentially different from the others,
ceases to be an ordinary and usual person, and becomes a distinct one in the eyes of the
other people. More precisely, singling out can be defined as an inter-group situation
in which one group is a singleton group made up of a single individual- the singled
out individual-, whose social identity is perceived as different by a second group that
is larger in size.
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Someone can be singled out because he or she possesses some desirable qualities;
therefore, the status of being singled out can be associated with a positive social
standing. For instance, in organizational and workplace settings, an employee may
be object of social recognition or appraisal for his or her desirable socio-economic
characteristics (e.g. age or experience) or because he or she belongs to a privileged
group, such as in the case, reported by Heikes (1991), of white-male nurses working
in all-female environment. As result, he or she loses the status of ordinary member,
and acquires a positive aura of uniqueness in the eyes of his or her colleagues or
superiors. A subject can also be singled out by others because he or she possesses
undesirable qualities; therefore, the status of being singled out can coincide with a
negative social standing. In line with the previous example, an employee may be
singled out by his or her colleagues or a superior for reproach or because he or she
is disliked within the team or belongs to socially disadvantaged minorities, such as
women or racial/ethnic minorities. The literature in social psychology offers several
examples of solo or token individuals who have been singled out in the workplace by
colleagues or superiors because of their undesirable qualities (e.g. see Kanter 1977;
Yoder and Aniakudo 1997; Niemann and Dovidio 1998; DePaulo and Morris 2006).
When the status of being singled out is attributable to something undesirable about the
socio-economic characteristics of the subject, the latter may also be object of social
exclusion, marginalization, stigmatization, negative stereotypes, bullying, or, more
generally, negative discrimination (e.g. Heatherton et al. 2000; Abrams et al. 2005).
In other words, the status of being singled out can be a precondition for these social
mechanisms.
While in some cases there may be a consensus among the members of the group on
who is the singled out individual, in others the latter is selected by a specific individual,
such a manager in an organizational setting:1 an agent who has the right and power to
enforce the status of being singled out.
This paper presents an experiment designed to test specifically the behavioral impli-
cations of singling out. We do so in the context of trust games. A trust game is a standard
stylized setup used in the economic literature to study trusting behavior and trustwor-
thiness. Economists are aware of the importance that both trust and trustworthiness
play in economic interactions, especially with respect to the formation of social capital
(e.g., Putnam 2000). In particular, they reduce the costs of transacting (Frank 1988),
promote efficiency in markets (Arrow 1974), improve cooperation (Smith et al. 1995)
and increase firms’ ability to adapt to complexity and change (Korsgaard et al. 1995).
Trust and trustworthiness are also considered to be “at the core of group life” (Hogg
et al. 2005, p. 193). In particular, they play a fundamental role in ensuring the stability
of a group or a team, and, therefore, are important in organizational and workplace
settings. Anything that perturbs the stability of the group or team may affect the way
in which the members trust and fulfill each other’s trust. As singling out may have
1 Other examples are a teacher in a classroom or a superior in an army force (for instance, think of the
overweight, and bumbling marine soldier who was named ‘gomer pyle’ by the drill instructor, in the
Kubrick’s movie Full Metal Jacket).
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important consequences in terms of group and team cohesion in organizations, it may
then also affect trust and trustworthiness. For this reason, the trust game appears to be
a natural environment where to test, as a starting point, the economic implications of
singling a member out in a group.
To test these implications, we artificially induced a status of being singled out in
the lab. Under a positive frame, the most preferred match in the experiment is singled
out, whereas, under a negative frame, the least preferred match in the experiment is
singled out. We controlled for identification effects by varying the extent to which
the status of being singled out could be identified by non-singled out subjects. That
is, in certain sessions, the singled out individual was identified with a mark (i.e. an
asterisk), and, therefore, recognizable by the other subjects, whereas in other sessions
the singled out participant was not marked with an asterisk, and, therefore, could
not be identified by the other participants. Furthermore, we tested the implications
of having a random assignation of such status under a neutral frame. In particular,
rather than having the status of being singled out assigned by the participants, it is
randomly assigned by the computer and, therefore, is not associated to being the least
or most preferred match. We also investigated the effects of singling a member out
under a negative frame when one specific individual rather than the whole group is
responsible of such decision. To check the robustness of our results against what we
refer as the individual characteristics hypothesis, we tested and rejected the possibility
that singled out subjects behaved differently because of the individual characteristics
that made them singled out. As such, this study provides evidence of the ‘pure’ effect
of singling out an individual from a group, controlling for the individual characteristics
of the singled out individual.
Our key finding is that singling out individuals has a negligible effect on trust and
is potentially negative in terms of trustworthiness. More specifically, we find that sin-
gled out subjects in the negative framework return considerably less than non-singled
out subjects, probably because they do not feel any bond with the other members
but anger and resentment for the attribution of a lower status. In contrast, the sin-
gled out subjects in the positive framework display a bimodal behavior, returning
either more or less, probably depending on whether they perceives themselves as
insiders or outsiders. We also find that non-singled out subjects return substantially
less to the singled out subject but only when they do not feel responsible of the dis-
tinct status of this person. Finally, we find that trustworthiness generally decreases
if there is a singled out subject. Section 2 briefly reviews some of the related lit-
erature. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 presents the alter-
native behavioral conjectures about the implications of singling an individual out.
Section 5 reports the main results. Section 6 provides a discussion of the findings and
concludes.
2 Related literature
In the economic literature, we did not locate any papers that specifically analyze the
economic implications of singling an individual out based on socio-economic cate-
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gories.2 However, an area of economic research somewhat related to our study is the
one that examines experimentally the impact of group identity. In our experiment, we
manipulate the social identity and status of one member, the singled out subject (and,
therefore, indirectly that of the other members, the non-singled out subjects), within
the reference group, thus creating de facto two potential distinct units: a majority
group and a singleton group, i.e. a group represented by only one individual. Hence,
our manipulation may have implications in line with the main findings of the eco-
nomic literature on group identity. Although there are several experimental works that
looked at group identity in economics (e.g. Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis 2002;
Tan and Bolle 2007; Chen and Li 2009; Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo 2009; Chen and
Chen 2011), none of them has considered a case of social fragmentation like the one
implemented in our experiment, in the context of a trust game. Two recent papers of
this literature are however particularly relevant for our study. The first is Tsutsui and
Zizzo (forthcoming). In this study, the authors investigated the role played by majority
versus minority groups, and high status versus low status groups in the context of trust
games.3 They observed that minority and low status subjects dislike being in such con-
dition, and discriminate generally less. The second study is Chakravarty and Fonseca
(2012), who studied the effects of social fragmentation and group identity on public
good contributions. While their vehicle of research (i.e. a six-player public good game)
differs from the one used in our experiment (i.e. a two-player trust game), in one treat-
ment they induce a social fragmentation resembling that of our experiment (i.e. one
subject experiencing solo status). They found that minority group subjects contribute
more to the public good than majority group and middle-sized group subjects.4
Another stream of research that is to some extent related to our study is the one that
looks at status, social recognition and ranking as a form of incentive in organizations
(e.g. Eriksson et al. 2012; Neckermann et al. 2012; Charness et al. 2013). This type
of mechanisms might evolve in or conceal a ‘singling out’ phenomenon insofar as the
allocation of the immaterial award or the implementation of the ranking is not based
solely on performance but it is, for example, based on subjective evaluation (see, for
instance, Neckermann et al. 2012) or the awarded individual starts to be perceived
differently by the others. All these studies have only considered the impact of such
2 There is a recent and interesting literature, in particular on public good games, that looked at how
“conferring status” to one or few members of the group affects plays of the game. However, none of these
studies considered the implications of a subject being disliked or liked, hence singled out by the others,
within a group. In particular, in that literature, status is usually conferred to subjects who obtained the
highest/lowest score in unrelated quizzes, and implies additional changes on how, for example, information
is transmitted to the players (e.g. Eckel et al. 2010); or it is conferred at the end of a play to top contributors
as a form of incentive to stimulate competition and promote cooperation (e.g. Pan and Houser 2011). Other
early studies explored more broadly the implications of social status, for instance, in markets (e.g. Ball
et al. 2001), and bargaining games (e.g. Ball and Eckel 1998). However, differently to our study and the
literature described above, status was not conferred to only one individual but to groups of subjects.
3 The group size varied from 4 subjects (minority) to 8 subjects (majority). Group status was manipulated
by labeling the high status group in terms of Blue group, whereas the low status group in terms of subjects
who do not belong to any group (Tsutsui and Zizzo, forthcoming).
4 These results might be affected by reputational effects. In particular, largely in treatment 5-1, and weakly
in treatment 4-2, minority group individuals are easily detectable even if the software randomized the display
order of the individual contributions.
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managerial tools on performance, without looking at their potential side effects (in
terms of inducing ‘singling out’) on trust and trustworthiness in the workplace. On
similar grounds, singling out may be also related to leadership, insofar as the leader
acquires uniqueness in the eyes of the others. Most of the economic literature on
leadership focused on the implications of having a leader making a public decision
(e.g. contribution to a public good) or sending a public message before the decisions of
the other players (e.g. Güth et al. 2007; Potters et al. 2007; Gächter et al. 2012). Some of
these studies also compared different mechanisms of appointing the leader (e.g. Rivas
and Sutter 2011; Brandts et al. 2011; Arbak and Villeval 2013). None of these studies
have however considered the potential implications in terms of group cohesion from
having a leader whose social identity is perceived as different by his or her followers.
Finally, some of the behavioral implications which might result from singling an
individual out might also be linked to psychological phenomena which has been
studied in the psychological research with respect to social exclusion/inclusion, mar-
ginalization, stigmatization, and stereotyping (for an overview of this literature, see
Heatherton et al. 2000; Abrams et al. 2005). This literature usually focuses on attitudes
rather than behavior (e.g., Sekaquaptewa and Thompson 2002; Thau et al. 2007), and
extensively uses deception as a way to manipulate the behavior when the latter is the
object of interest (e.g., Twenge et al. 2001, 2007; Derfler-Rozin et al. 2010).
3 Experimental design
3.1 Outline
The experiment was conducted between March and July 2011 at the University of
East Anglia with a total of 324 subjects divided into 54 sessions; there were 6 sub-
jects per session.5 The participants were mostly students with a variety of different
backgrounds.6 The experiment was fully computerized with the z-Tree software (Fis-
chbacher 2007). Subjects received both computerized and printed instructions at the
beginning of each experimental task. The presentation of the experimental instruc-
tions was as neutral as possible avoiding terms such “trust”, “truster”, or “trustee”.
The experiment employed a fictional currency, the experimental credit, which was
converted to pounds at the end of the experiment at the rate of 20 UK pence per
experimental credit. Subjects earned on average £11.78 (around 18–19 US dollars),
including a show-up fee of £1.50. Earnings were paid privately and anonymously at
subjects’ stations at the end of the experiment. Each session lasted around 35 minutes.
Subjects were allowed to participate in no more than one session.
5 We ran sessions with only 6 players in order to have enough variation in characteristics between sessions
and minimize the possibility that specific characteristics were systematically associated to the singled out
subject. Further advantages of running the sessions with only 6 players were that of reducing the chances of
subjects knowing each other; minimizing the likelihood of subjects seeing and interacting with each other
as they arrived, as they were immediately seated, avoiding people queuing at the entrance of the lab; and
minimizing the likelihood of the subjects seeing each other as they left; partitions ensured that subjects did
not see each other during the experiment.
6 Details of the socioeconomic background of the experimental participants, and experimental instructions
can be found in the online appendix.
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The experiment consisted of seven treatments, described below: the baseline (B),
the black sheep treatment (BS), the golden sheep treatment (GS), the random sheep
treatment (RS), the privately informed black sheep treatment (PIBS), the privately
informed golden sheep treatment (PIGS), and the authority and black sheep treatment
(ABS). We ran eight sessions per treatment (seven in PIBS and PIGS).
3.2 Beginning of the experiment and ranking phase
In each session, subjects were randomly assigned to computer terminals, which were
separated by partitions in order to avoid facial or verbal communication between
subjects. After being assigned to computer stations, subjects were asked to fill in
a questionnaire with their personal information. In particular, we asked subjects to
indicate their gender, age, current university status, country of origin, whether their
main field of studies was related to Economics or not, their religion, whether they
used Facebook or not, their current relationship status, and whether they smoked or
not. After completing the questionnaire, subjects received the instructions for the first
experimental task (i.e. trust game).
Once everyone had finished reading the instructions, each subject was informed
about these characteristics for the other participants, and asked to rank them accord-
ing to how much she or he would like to be matched with them in the experiment
(from the most preferred match to the least preferred match).7 Without informing the
participants ex ante, the computer allocated to each subject a certain number of points
corresponding to the rank assigned by each other participant to that specific individual
(i.e. five points for being ranked first, four for being ranked second, and so on), and
ordered the subjects from the participant with the most points (the most preferred
match) to the one with the least points (the least preferred match).8 In other words,
the computer applied a Borda count to the individual rankings in order to determine a
consensus-based preference ordering of the participants.
A disadvantage of the Borda count is that it may induce strategic behaviors or a
false revelation of own preferences. This is not a problem in our experiment because
subjects were not informed ex ante about the aggregation procedure and why they had
to rank the other participants (i.e. selection of the singled out subject). Furthermore,
we are not interested in the results of the Borda count per se, but only as a framing
tool to induce singling out.
3.3 The baseline (B) treatment
The experimental treatments differed in what followed the ranking phase.9 We first
describe the B treatment. After all the subjects submitted their rankings, they were not
7 Ties in the ranking were not allowed.
8 Ties in the ranking were dealt with by the computer with a random draw.
9 A critical reader might argue that the ranking phase might change later trust game play. However, all we
are interested in this paper is across-treatment differences, and these cannot be explained by the ranking
phase, which equally preceded all treatments.
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told how the computer processed these data. The participants simply proceeded to the
next phase. In particular, they filled in a control questionnaire designed to check their
understanding of the instructions. Clarifications were individually given to subjects
with incorrect answers. The experimental task was a standard Berg et al. (1995)’s trust
game. In this set-up, a truster (the first mover) must decide how much to invest/keep of
an endowment X (48 experimental credits in our case). Calling the amount invested T,
the investment gives 3 × T. This investment’s return is sent to the trustee (the second
mover) who must decide how to share the received amount with the truster. If she keeps
Y, the total payoffs will be (X − T) + 3 × T − Y, for the truster, and Y for the trustee,
respectively. T measures the amount of trust, 3 × T − Y measures trust fulfilling and
therefore, trustworthiness. There were 4 rounds of the trust game. In each round, each
subject was matched with a different co-participant (absolute stranger matching). In
this way, we avoided reputation building, which could stem from re-matching the same
subjects more than once. Each subject was also randomly assigned the role of trustee
for half the time and truster for the other half. The randomness of the order in which
roles were assigned to subjects enabled us to rule out any effect due to playing first as
truster or trustee. In addition, any across-treatment differences cannot be explained by
the fact that individuals played both roles since this equally occurred in all treatments.
No information about a co-participant (e.g. participant’s ID, gender, nationality, and so
on) was revealed to the subjects. At the end of each round, each subject was informed
about the decision of the counterpart and the experimental credits that he or she could
earn if the round were to be selected for the payment.
Once subjects completed this experimental task, a new set of instructions for an
incentivized individual task was given. This new task was a standard Holt and Laury
(2002) questionnaire in the domain of gains.10 The aim of the task was to measure
risk attitude by counting the number of times subjects chose the safer option. The task
details are in the experimental instructions. A further questionnaire was then given,
in two parts. The first part was the 17-item Social Desirability Scale (Stöber 2001).
This scale measures the desire to present oneself in a positive light. For each item
of the scale, a subject has to decide if the statement describes himself/herself or not
(true-or-false type of scale). The second part of the questionnaire was the Rosenberg’s
(1965) self-esteem scale, widely used in psychology to measure state self-esteem. For
each of the ten items of the scale, a subjects has to indicate how much he or she agree
with the statement on a four-point scale (from strongly agrees to strongly disagree).
Final payments were based on the earnings of one randomly chosen trust game round,
plus the earnings from the Holt and Laury (2002) task.
3.4 Other treatments
Now we turn to the description of the other treatments. These were identical to the
B treatment except in what follows. In the black sheep (BS treatment), after all the
subjects submitted their rankings, the computer explained how it processed these data
10 Houser et al. (2010) found no evidence for order effects from having the Holt and Laury task played
after the trust game and vice versa.
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to determine which one was considered the least preferred match in the experiment,
i.e. the participant that everyone else least wanted to interact with in the experiment.
Subjects were also told that whenever a participant was matched with the least preferred
match during the experiment, the least preferred match would be identified with a
mark (i.e. an asterisk). The real identity of the least preferred match was not revealed
at any point of the experiment.11 Through this procedure, we artificially induced an
identifiable status of being singled out which was based on consensually undesirable
attributes.
The golden sheep (GS) treatment was similar to the BS treatment except that the
computer explained how it processed the data on the individual rankings to determine
which participant was considered the most preferred match in the experiment, i.e. the
participant that everyone else most wanted to interact with in the experiment. Each
subject was then informed whether he or she was the most preferred match. The most
preferred match was identified with an asterisk during the trust game. In contrast to
the BS treatment, the aim of the GS treatment was to induce an artificial identifiable
status of being singled out which was based on consensually desirable attributes.
In the privately informed black sheep, PIBS (privately informed golden sheep,
PIGS), treatment, after the ranking phase, the computer informed the subjects about
how the least (most) preferred match was selected from the individual rankings, and
told the least (most) preferred match about his or her status. However, the singled out
participant was not marked with an asterisk during the experiment. In other words,
the singled out subject could not be identified by the other participants during the
trust game. This treatment was designed to disentangle the “pure” effect of being
singled out, which comes from the personal recognition of the singled out subject to
be consensually disliked (liked), from the effect of being identifiable as the singled
out subject by the others.
In the authority and black sheep (ABS) treatment, after the ranking phase, the
computer informed the subjects that the individual ranking of one randomly selected
participant from the experiment (i.e. the authority) determined who was considered the
least preferred match in the experiment. In particular, the least preferred match was the
participant that the authority least wanted to interact with in the experiment according
to his or her individual ranking. As in the BS treatment, the least preferred match was
identified with an asterisk. Subjects were also told whether they were the authority or
not, and that the authority could not be matched with the least preferred match during
the experiment. This is because we wanted to isolate the behavioral reaction of the
singled out subject towards those who were not responsible of his or her status. Note
that in the ABS treatment we were not interested in identifying and inducing a real
status of being authority. Indeed, what we refer as the authority is simply an individual
randomly selected by the computer. Here, we simply wanted to investigate the effects
11 Our subjects were recruited using the ORSEE software (Greiner 2004) from the UEA subject pool of
over 1,000 potential participants, thus ensuring a systematic randomization of the participants while at the
same time minimizing the probability that among the 6 subjects there were acquaintances that could pick
up on specific combinations of characteristics to identify co-participants. Importantly, while information
was provided on subjects during the ranking phase, once a singled out subject was picked up, we did not
reveal his or her individual characteristics on the screen. Overall, there is therefore good reason to believe
that subjects did not know who the singled out subject was.
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Table 1 Features of
experimental treatments Treatment Sessions Asterisk Social standing Being responsible
B 8 NO NO –
BS 8 YES Negative YES
GS 8 YES Positive YES
RS 8 YES Neutral NO
PIBS 7 NO Negative YES
PIGS 7 NO Positive YES
ABS 8 YES Negative NO
of singling a member out, under a negative frame, when a specific individual rather
than the whole group is responsible of such decision. This treatment, together with the
RS treatment, enabled us to test the implications on trust and trustworthiness of shifting
the responsibility for the condition of the singled out individual to someone else.
Finally, in the random sheep (RS) treatment, subjects were simply told that one of
them was going to be randomly singled out by the computer and identified with an
asterisk for the rest of the experiment. Hence, here the status of being singled out was
not associated to a negative nor a positive social standing. This treatment was designed
to pick up the effect of a random attribution of distinctiveness under a neutral frame,
and when no participant was responsible for such attribution.
As noted earlier, these treatments were identical to the B treatment except for the
points noted above, e.g. subjects filled in an initial control questionnaire designed to
check their understanding of the instructions, and had a Holt and Laury (2002) and
a psychological questionnaire at the end. Table 1 summarizes the main features of
our treatments. In BS, we artificially induced a negative identifiable status of being
singled out in order to study its implications on trust and trust fulfilling within a group
of individuals. GS was identical to BS except that we artificially induced a positive
identifiable status of being singled out. In PIBS and PIGS, we controlled for the possi-
ble effect that being identifiable as singled out subject has on the behavior of this latter
individual. In other words, we removed the effect of identification. RS tested whether
the identification mark per se affects the behavior of the singled out subject, when
no other subject is responsible for his or her status. Finally, in ABS we investigated
the implications of having a singled out member within a group of subjects when a
specific subject is the only one to blame for the status of the singled out individual.
4 Behavioral conjectures
To understand the consequences of singling an agent out, we consider the following
individual’s utility function that linearly depends on the own (πO) and counterpart’s
(πC ) monetary payoffs:12
UO (πO , πC ) = wOπO + wCπC
12 This utility function was proposed by Charness and Rabin (2002) to capture social preferences and
extended by Chen and Li (2009) to incorporate group identity.
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wO and wC are the weights that the individual puts on the own and counterpart’s
payoffs respectively, with wC = 1−wO . We assume that the weight that the individual
places on the own payoffs depends on a series of elements (e.g. fairness, reciprocity)
including the social distance of the two individuals, by which we mean the degree of
demographic similarity between the two agents (Buchan et al. 2006).13
To formalize this, let IO be the social distance of the individual with respect to the
counterpart and θO all other elements that affects the weight. We can rewrite the utility
function as
UO (πO , πC ) = wO (IO , θO) πO + [1 − wO (IO , θO)]πC
where ∂wO/∂ IO ≤ 0 and ∂wO/∂θO ≥ 0 for any IO and θO . θO is a parameter that
captures the distribution and other-regarding preferences of the individual, other than
those related to social distance. θO can, for example, identify the charity concern of
the individual when his or her payoff is higher than his or her counterpart’s payoff
or the envy when his or her payoff is lower than his or her counterpart’s payoff (see
Charness and Rabin 2002; Chen and Li 2009); it can also capture reciprocity concerns.
If ∂wO/∂θO = 0, the individual does not care about other-regarding preferences not
captured by IO .
If ∂wO/∂ IO = 0, the individual does not care about social distance; the more
negative ∂wO/∂ IO is, the more the individual cares about social distance and the
more he or she will weigh the own payoff compared to the counterpart’s payoff. In
terms of our manipulation, this means that non-singled out subjects will weigh the
payoff of the singled out subject less compared to other non-singled out individuals.
This is because they will perceive the singled out subject as socially distant from them.
As a result, non-singled out subjects will treat the singled out subject worse than other
individuals (see, for example, Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo 2009), especially if the
subject is singled out because of his or her undesirable qualities. At the same time,
the presence of a singled out subject will strengthen the feelings of in-group inclusion
of the other members (Pickett and Brewer 2005), thus inducing reciprocal favoritism
among those individuals. Similarly, the member who has been singled out will give and
return less compared to other individuals because he or she no longer feels any bond
with the other members. Hence, the first two conjectures (social distance conjectures)
are as follows.
Conjecture 1 When the condition of singled out is made salient, non-singled out
members will give and return less (more) to the singled out individual (to other non-
singled out individuals).
Conjecture 2 The singled out individual will be less trusting and trustworthy com-
pared to other individuals.
13 Two individuals may differ in many demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, ethnicity, social
status, class, etc. Social distance captures the extent to which they are overall different. It can be also
measured in terms of group identity (Charness et al. 2007; Buchan et al. 2006). In particular, two individuals
are socially closer if they belong to the same social group and more distant if they do not belong to the same
group (Buchan et al. 2006).
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Conjecture 1 may be sensitive to whether the responsibility of singling a member
out is attributable or not to the non-singled out individual interacting with the singled
out member. In particular, in the former case, non-singled out subjects might experi-
ence guilt and distress for the singled out subject’s condition. This is what Charness
(2000, p. 375), in a different context, called the responsibility-alleviation effect, i.e.
a mitigation of “internal impulses toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity” because of
“shifting the responsibility for an outcome to an external authority”. In the context of
singling out, this means that non-singled out individuals, who can be held responsible
for the condition of the singled out individual, might feel guilty, and, therefore, less
inclined to treat him or her worse than the others. In other words, this psychological
effect counterbalances the effect of perceiving the singled out individual as an out-
sider (Conjecture 1). The result is that, when the non-singled out individuals can be
held responsible for the status of the singled out individual, the two effects may can-
cel out and therefore we should observe no discrimination. On the other hand, when
they cannot be held responsible, there is no guilt involved, and, therefore, we should
observe negative discrimination that stems from perceiving the singled out individual
as an outsider. Hence, in complement to Conjecture 1, we also consider the following
conjecture (responsibility conjecture).
Conjecture 3 Non-singled out members interacting with the singled out individual
will give and return less to him/her than non-singled out individuals, only when they
are not responsible for his or her condition.
In opposition to Conjecture 2, it is also possible that the member, who has been
singled out because of his or her undesirable qualities, will trust and fulfill trust more
in order to demonstrate his or her social value to the others. Such behavior would
be consistent with some studies in social psychology showing that individuals who
are at the risk of exclusion engage in pro-social behavior in order to reconnect with
the others (e.g. Derfler-Rozin et al. 2010). In terms of our utility function, this means
that the individual who is consensually disliked in the group will weigh the payoff
of the counterpart more than other individuals will do. In a similar fashion but for a
different reason, the weight that the consensually liked member put on the payoff of the
counterpart may be larger than the weight put by other members. This is because he or
she may perceive his or her relationship with the others as an intra-group relationship
where he or she fulfill a special role, with a greater responsibility for the wealth
of the group due to the higher status’ attribution. Hence, consistently with some of
the findings of the psychological research on leadership theory (e.g. Hogg 2001),
the positively singled out individual may display in-group favoritism towards the
other individuals and, therefore, be less selfish or adopt pro-social behaviors. Taking
these considerations into account, we can devise the following conjecture, opposed
to Conjecture 2, regarding the behavior of the singled out individual (social standing
conjecture):
Conjecture 4 The negatively (positively) singled out individual will be more trusting
and trustworthy compared to other individuals.
Note that all the aforementioned conjectures are related to the pure effect of singling
out and abstract from the individual characteristics of the singled out individuals. As
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Table 2 Giving and return rates to singled out and non-singled out
B BS GS RS PIBS PIGS ABS Tot.
Giving rate* 0.400 0.387 0.398 0.402 0.367 0.405 0.400 0.394
To singled out – 0.354 0.318 0.284 – – 0.387 0.336
To non-singled out** – 0.422 0.421 0.456 – – 0.432 0.414
Return rate* 0.244 0.138 0.210 0.204 0.162 0.195 0.184 0.191
To singled out – 0.216 0.198 0.142 – – 0.100 0.165
To non-singled out** – 0.147 0.212 0.201 – – 0.246 0.206
Tot total
* Overall giving/return rate
** Giving/return rate of non-singled out subjects to non-singled out subjects
our experiment induces the status of being singled out artificially, we are able to pro-
vide a powerful test of these conjectures ruling out any explanations that stem from the
particular individual characteristics of the singled out individual. In particular, we can
test for Conjecture 1, by comparing the behavior of non-singled out subjects towards
the singled out individual and other non-singled subjects with the behavior of baseline
subjects. If Conjecture 1 is sensitive to the responsibility-alleviation effect (Conjec-
ture 3), we should observe a drop in trust and/or trustworthiness of non-singled out
subjects towards the singled out individual only in ABS and RS. Finally, Conjectures
2 and 4 can be tested by looking at the behavior of the singled out subject compared to
baseline subjects. On this respect, our control treatments PIBS and PIGS allow us to
test the “pure” effect of being singled out, removing any effects that stem from being
identifiable as the singled out subject by the others.
5 Experimental results
Our focus in this paper is on the results of the trust games.14 The giving rate identifies
the proportion of endowment that the truster transfers to the trustee, while the return
rate measures the amount returned by the trustee to the truster as a fraction of the total
amount received from the truster (i.e. three times the amount given by the truster).
Tables 2 and 3 show average giving and return rates for each experimental treatment,
while Fig. 1 displays giving and return rates for each experimental treatment. Note
that, while Table 3 provides information on most and least preferred subjects in the
baseline for comparison with the other treatments, most and least preferred subjects
in this treatment were not singled out.15
14 We have also analyzed matching preferences as revealed in our unincentivized initial ranking phase.
These are presented in the online appendix. Throughout the paper, except where otherwise specified, session
averages are used as the unit of observation for bivariate statistical tests (the reported p values are two tailed),
and individual averages as the unit of observation for the regression analysis.
15 If we focus on the baseline subjects, and compare the behavior of both the least and most preferred
baseline matches with the behavior of the other baseline participants, we do not detect any statistically
significant difference in mean giving and return rates (Wilcoxon p > 0.1).
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Table 3 Giving and return rates from singled out, non-singled out, and authority
B BS GS RS PIBS PIGS ABS Tot.
Giving rate* 0.400 0.387 0.398 0.402 0.367 0.405 0.400 0.394
From ‘singled out’** 0.500a 0.413b 0.280 0.385 0.307 0.412 0.329 0.387 0.349
From non-singled out*** – 0.422 0.421 0.456 0.358 0.420 0.432 0.414
From authority – – – – – – 0.331 0.331
Return rate* 0.244 0.138 0.210 0.204 0.162 0.195 0.184 0.191
From ‘singled out’** 0.320a 0.283b 0.037 0.211 0.260 0.073 0.204 0.211 0.164
From non-singled out*** – 0.147 0.212 0.201 0.185 0.193 0.246 0.206
From authority – – – – – – 0.078 0.078
Tot total, B baseline
∗ Overall giving/return rate
∗∗ Giving/return rate from most preferred and least preferred subjects to non-singled out subjects; most
preferred or least preferred subjects were singled out in all treatments except the B treatment, for which
values are provided as controls
∗∗∗ Giving/return rate of non-singled out subjects to non-singled out subjects
a Giving/return rate from the least preferred baseline subject
b Giving/return rate from the most preferred baseline subject
To verify treatment effects, controlling for different covariates, we conduct a regres-
sion analysis on mean giving and return rate by each subject.16 In particular,we employ
Tobit regressions17 with clustered robust standard errors in order to control for the
possible non-independence of the observations within a same session.18 Regressions
1–2 in Table 4 and regressions 3–4 in Table 5 use the mean giving and return rate
respectively to non-singled out subjects as dependent variable, while regressions 5–6
in Table 6 and regressions 7–8 in Table 7 use respectively the giving and return rate
to singled out subjects.19 This distinction between giving/return rate to non-singled
16 The i observation on the giving/return rate corresponds to the average giving/return rate of the i-th
subject over the two rounds of the trust game where the subject played as truster/trustee (note from the
design section that each subject played two times in the role of truster and two times in the role of trustee in a
random order). We use individual averages in order to control for the non-independence of the observations
at individual level. Note in fact that we have two potential levels of non-independence: at individual and
session level. By taking the individual mean giving and return rates, we control for the first. This simplifies
our estimation, reducing potential endogeneity issues and providing more comparable results with previous
studies (e.g. Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo 2009, Tsustui and Zizzo, in press). In the on-line appendix, we also
report the results of Tobit regressions with clustered robust standard errors at subject level or session level,
and multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions, where the unit of observation is the round. The results of
these regressions are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper. However, they do not fully control
for the non-independence of the observations or the censored nature of the data, leaving the regressions
reported in the paper as a better estimation option.
17 Giving and return rates lie between 0 and 1.
18 We have also conducted random effects regressions, which however, generally failed to pass the Hausman
diagnostic test. The only regressions that did pass the Hausman diagnostic test are on the giving rate to
non-singled out and singled out subjects. Their results broadly replicate those in the paper.
19 Note that each subject could not interact with a singled out individual (or any other subject) more than
once. Hence, each observation of regressions 7–8, in a treatment where the singled out was identified by an
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Table 4 Regressions on giving rate to non-singled out subjects
Regression 1 Regression 2
b SE p b SE p
All treatments −0.01 0.1 0.919
BS + PIBS −0.059 0.11 0.594
GS + PIGS 0.016 0.11 0.887
RS 0 0.12 0.997
ABS 0.022 0.11 0.847
Singled out in RS −0.081 0.08 0.301 −0.066 0.12 0.585
Singled out in ABS −0.001 0.07 0.984 0.031 0.08 0.684
Singled out in BS and PIBS −0.02 0.12 0.868 −0.066 0.12 0.576
Singled out in GS and PIGS −0.098 0.06 0.128 −0.071 0.08 0.36
Selector −0.103 0.15 0.494 −0.073 0.13 0.579
Risk Aversion −0.005 0.01 0.596 −0.007 0.01 0.496
SDS17 Score −0.015 0.01 0.117 −0.015 0.01 0.12
RSE Score −0.004 0 0.37 −0.004 0 0.408
Age 0.009 0.01 0.175 0.009 0.01 0.16
Gender 0.037 0.04 0.321 0.033 0.04 0.385
Economics −0.113** 0.05 0.022 −0.111** 0.05 0.027
UK −0.051 0.05 0.268 −0.053 0.05 0.251
India −0.206*** 0.07 0.002 −0.199*** 0.07 0.003
Christian −0.07* 0.04 0.087 −0.076* 0.04 0.056
Muslim −0.334**** 0.09 0 −0.333**** 0.09 0
Single 0.084* 0.04 0.051 0.089** 0.04 0.041
Smoker 0.019 0.08 0.804 0.029 0.08 0.705
PhD 0.035 0.08 0.651 0.037 0.08 0.64
Constant 0.221 0.19 0.253 0.228 0.18 0.212
Obs 324 324
Pseudo R-sqr 0.091 0.086
Df 302 305
Prob > F 0 0
Tobit regression with clustered robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001
out subjects and giving/return rate to singled out subjects allows us to test whether
singled out subjects discriminate against non-singled out subjects and/or the reverse
relative to the Baseline treatment. In particular, they allow us to separate individual
decisions made when a subject was matched with a singled out individual and with a
non-singled out individual.
The regressions employ dummy variables for the experimental treatments, either
individually (BS = 1 for BS treatment observations, and similarly for GS, RS, PIBS,
Footnote 19 continued
asterisk, is not an average across two rounds but corresponds to the giving/return rate of a non-singled out
subject interacting with a singled out subject.
123
F. Galeotti, D. J. Zizzo
Table 5 Regressions on return rate to non-singled out subjects
Regression 3 Regression 4
b SE p b SE p
Trust rate as trustee 0.406**** 0.06 0.000 0.409**** 0.06 0.000
All treatments −0.076* 0.04 0.052
BS + PIBS −0.107** 0.05 0.026
GS + PIGS −0.078* 0.05 0.091
RS −0.041 0.06 0.487
ABS −0.047 0.07 0.496
Singled out in RS 0.105 0.11 0.359 0.143 0.10 0.141
Singled out in ABS 0.109 0.13 0.398 0.138 0.10 0.185
Singled out in BS and PIBS −0.129*** 0.05 0.007 −0.160*** 0.05 0.001
Singled out in GS and PIGS 0.064 0.08 0.420 0.060 0.07 0.418
Authority −0.170**** 0.05 0.000 −0.143**** 0.04 0.001
Risk Aversion 0.004 0.01 0.574 0.002 0.01 0.742
SDS17 Score −0.005 0.01 0.379 −0.006 0.01 0.332
RSE Score −0.007* 0.00 0.094 −0.006 0.00 0.127
Authority × SDS17 0.048*** 0.02 0.003 0.048*** 0.02 0.002
Authority × RSE 0.004 0.01 0.471 0.003 0.01 0.514
Authority × Risk Aversion −0.008 0.02 0.653 −0.006 0.02 0.711
Age 0.003 0.01 0.630 0.003 0.00 0.594
Gender 0.011 0.03 0.718 0.009 0.03 0.761
Economics −0.083** 0.04 0.049 −0.081** 0.04 0.047
UK −0.060 0.05 0.185 −0.060 0.05 0.193
India −0.058 0.06 0.323 −0.056 0.06 0.350
Christian −0.002 0.04 0.958 −0.007 0.04 0.845
Muslim −0.118 0.08 0.161 −0.122 0.08 0.146
Single 0.067** 0.03 0.024 0.067** 0.03 0.021
Smoker −0.012 0.04 0.758 −0.009 0.04 0.817
PhD −0.013 0.06 0.821 −0.010 0.06 0.856
Constant 0.151 0.14 0.273 0.152 0.12 0.217
Obs 307 307
Pseudo R-sqr 0.393 0.382
Df 281 284
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
Tobit regression with clustered robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001
PIGS and ABS) or in combination (RS + ABS = 1 for RS or ABS treatments observa-
tions,20 and similarly for BS + PIBS and for GS + PIGS). In regressions 2 and 4 we
20 The singled out subject was selected by the computer (i.e. through a random draw) in RS, and by the
authority (i.e. the participant whose individual ranking determined who was considered the least preferred
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Table 6 Regressions on giving rate to singled out subjects
Regression 5 Regression 6
b SE p b SE p
Asterisk −0.127 0.11 0.27
BS −0.067 0.14 0.638
GS −0.127 0.15 0.404
PIBS −0.07 0.12 0.57 −0.071 0.12 0.566
PIGS −0.013 0.12 0.917 −0.012 0.12 0.921
RS + ABS −0.157 0.13 0.222
Risk aversion −0.008 0.01 0.568 −0.006 0.01 0.63
SDS17 Score −0.007 0.01 0.512 −0.007 0.01 0.527
RSE Score −0.006 0.01 0.367 −0.006 0.01 0.376
Age 0.013 0.01 0.149 0.013 0.01 0.156
Gender −0.022 0.06 0.7 −0.023 0.06 0.677
Economics −0.15* 0.08 0.064 −0.156* 0.08 0.056
UK −0.036 0.07 0.607 −0.035 0.07 0.611
India −0.220** 0.09 0.014 −0.215* 0.09 0.013
Christian −0.049 0.06 0.421 −0.045 0.06 0.459
Muslim −0.434*** 0.14 0.002 −0.431*** 0.14 0.002
Single 0.061 0.06 0.298 0.059 0.06 0.323
Smoker 0.058 0.11 0.593 0.053 0.11 0.628
PhD −0.119 0.09 0.208 −0.121 0.09 0.203
Constant 0.18 0.23 0.437 0.189 0.23 0.408
Obs 196 196
R-sqr 0.086 0.084
Df 178 180
Prob > F 0.015 0.009
Tobit regression with clustered robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001
use a single dummy variable (“All Treatments”) for all treatments with a singled out
subject; in regressions 6 and 8 we employ a single dummy variable (“Asterisk”) for
all treatments where the singled out was identified by an asterisk. In regressions 1–4
we also employ dummy variables, one for each treatment, which take value 1 if the
subject was a singled out subjects in BS and PIBS or alternatively in GS and PIGS;21
Footnote 20 continued
match) in ABS: in both treatment s subjects matched with the singled out individual were not responsible for
her/his status. In a bivariate test, we find no statistically significant evidence of a different mean giving/return
rate to singled out subjects between the two treatments (Mann-Whitney p > 0.1). Hence, we employ a
unique dummy to identify both RS and ABS treatment in regressions 5 and 7 (i.e. giving and return rate to
singled out subjects).
21 Giving/return rates of singled out subjects in BS and PIBS display a similar pattern (Mann-Whitney
p > 0.1), as do the giving/return rates in GS and PIGS (Mann-Whitney p > 0.1).
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Table 7 Regressions on return rate to singled out subjects
Regression 7 Regression 8
b SE p b SE p
Trust rate as trustee 0.437**** 0.08 0.000 0.416**** 0.07 0.000
Asterisk −0.130*** 0.05 0.005
BS −0.016 0.09 0.858
GS −0.063 0.06 0.297
PIBS −0.070 0.04 0.109 −0.076* 0.04 0.087
PIGS −0.082 0.06 0.157 −0.091 0.06 0.119
RS + ABS −0.201**** 0.06 0.000
Risk aversion −0.004 0.01 0.606 −0.002 0.01 0.766
SDS17 Score 0.005 0.01 0.433 0.004 0.01 0.496
RSE Score −0.005 0.00 0.330 −0.005 0.00 0.231
Age 0.007 0.01 0.245 0.007 0.01 0.239
Gender −0.027 0.04 0.448 −0.020 0.04 0.575
Economics −0.048 0.05 0.323 −0.063 0.05 0.195
UK 0.031 0.05 0.532 0.024 0.05 0.623
India −0.077 0.05 0.140 −0.098* 0.05 0.054
Christian −0.048 0.04 0.199 −0.049 0.04 0.195
Muslim −0.138* 0.08 0.098 −0.094 0.09 0.312
Single 0.032 0.04 0.371 0.036 0.04 0.326
Smoker 0.018 0.05 0.717 0.013 0.05 0.799
PhD 0.037 0.07 0.586 0.031 0.07 0.657
Constant 0.056 0.14 0.695 0.047 0.15 0.754
Obs 179 179
Pseudo R-sqr 0.491 0.438
Df 160 162
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
Tobit regression with clustered robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001
we also use a further dummy variable for the authority (Authority = 1 for authorities).
In the return rate regressions (Tables 5, 7), an extra explanatory variable is the giving
rate received by the trustee.22 All the regressions include demographic variables, such
as age, gender (=1 for men), economics background (=1 if applicable), nationality
(UK=1 for UK subjects, and India =1 for Indian subjects), religion (Christian = 1 for
Christian subjects, Muslim + 1 for Muslim subjects), whether the subject smokes or
not (Smoker + 1 for smoker subjects), whether the subject is a MPhil/PhD student or
not (PhD = 1 for MPhil/PhD students) and relationship status (Single = 1 for sub-
22 The return rate may in fact depend on the amount sent by the truster, i.e. the giving rate of the trustee’s
counterpart. This is because of several psychological reasons such as inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt
1999), reciprocity (Falk and Fischbacher 2006), and trust responsiveness (Guerra and Zizzo 2004).
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jects who were not in a relationship or were unmarried), and psychological measures
(i.e. social desirability, self-esteem, and risk attitude).23 In the regressions of Table 5,
we added interaction terms between Authority and the psychological measures.24
Table 4 If we first consider the findings regarding the giving rate to non-singled
out subjects, none of the treatment dummies is statistically significant. Among the
dummy variables identifying the giving rates from singled out subjects, none of them
is statistically significant. This brings us to the following result that does not seem to
support Conjecture 1 with respect to trusting behavior.
Result 1 The presence of singled out subjects did not affect mean giving rates to
non-singled out subjects.
Table 5 Turning to the return rate to non-singled out subjects, and in line with
previous findings on trust games, the giving rate from the truster are found to positively
affect the return rate of the trustee (p = 0.000). We also find that the least preferred
match, in line with Conjecture 2, and the authority returned significantly less than
other subjects (p < 0.01).
Result 2 Least preferred singled out subjects, and authorities, were less trustworthy
than baseline subjects.
In contrast, there is no evidence that the return rates from the most preferred singled
out subjects in GS and PIGS treatments were different from those of baseline subjects.
Hence, we reject both Conjectures 2 and 4 with respect to the trustworthiness of the
most preferred singled out individual.
However, a closer look at the distribution of the mean return rates (Fig. 2) reveals
why the dummy ‘Singled out in GS and PIGS’ does not turn to be statistically signifi-
cant. In BS and PIBS singled out subjects display only low return rates (between 0 and
0.117 in BS, and 0 and 0.167 in PIBS), while Fig. 2 shows a different, bimodal pattern
for GS and PIGS, with either high or low return rates.25 We can therefore derive the fol-
lowing result, which, relatively to trustworthiness, partially supports both Conjectures
2 and 4.
23 We do not introduce a dummy variable for Facebook use since only 7 subjects out of 324 in our sample
stated that they do not use Facebook. Also, since the risk elicitation task was administered at the end of
the experiment, it is possible that subjects made more or less risky choices depending on their expected
earnings obtained in the trust game. If such a bias exists, we should observe a correlation between our
measure of risk aversion and the expected payoffs from the trust game. However, this correlation is low
and not significant (Spearman ρ = 0.013, p = 0.818). Hence, we conclude that there is no evidence of
systematic bias in measuring risk aversion. Finally, we have also tried other specifications where we have
included interactions of the dummies for most and least preferred subjects with dummies related to those
attributes (i.e. UK, single, PhD) which were more likely to characterize least and most preferred subjects
(see section E of the online appendix, and section 4 of the paper). None of these interaction terms resulted
significant.
24 In all the regressions, all the psychological variables as well as the ‘Trust Rate as Trustee’ variable are
centered in order to control for the high correlation between the independent variables. In other words, we
subtract the mean from every observation. For a discussion, see Marquardt 1980.
25 BS and PIBS return rates have a standard deviation respectively of 0.049 and 0.082, while in B return
rates are smoothly distributed between 0.042 and 0.392 with a standard deviation of 0.125. In contrast,
the return rates lie between 0 and 0.483 in GS and between 0 and 0.5 in PIGS, with a standard deviation
respectively of 0.224 and 0.226.
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Fig. 2 Frequencies of return rates from singled out subjects
Result 3 Most preferred singled out matches, i.e. singled out subjects under a positive
frame, behave bimodally, with either high or low return rates.
Result 3 implies that the variance of return rates of most preferred matches should
be higher than that of return rates of baseline subjects; Siegel-Tukey tests support this
(p = 0.007).26 Conversely, return rates variance by least preferred matches (BS and
PIBS) is not statistically different from that in the B treatment (p = 0.271),27 and
equally the variance of return rates by most preferred subjects in the B treatment does
not differ from that of other baseline subjects (p = 0.164).
Going back to the regressions of Table 5, Authority × SDS17 is statistically sig-
nificant (p < 0.05). This implies that authorities with a high score in the SDS17
questionnaire return proportionally more; this suggests that they perceive that social
pressure is put on them (Zizzo and Fleming 2011).
The aggregate treatments dummy of regression 4 is mildly significantly negative
(p = 0.052). In regression 3, all the coefficients of treatment variables are negative.
26 A treatment-by-treatment comparison gives similar results (the p-values are 0.001 and 0.076 for respec-
tively B versus GS and B versus PIGS).
27 A treatment-by-treatment comparison again gives similar results (the p-values are 0.561 and 0.611 for
respectively B versus BS and B versus PIBS).
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However, only the coefficients of BS+PIBS and PG+PIGS are strongly and mildly
statistically significant respectively. This evidence brings us to the next result that,
relatively to trustworthiness, is strikingly in opposition to Conjecture 1.
Result 4 There is some evidence that the presence of a singled out subject reduced
return rates to non-singled out subjects. This is particularly prominent in the treatments
where the singled out subject was the least preferred match.
Table 6 In the regressions on the giving rate to singled out subjects, all the coeffi-
cients of the treatments dummies are negative, but statistically not significant.
Result 5 Once covariates are controlled for, giving rates towards singled out subjects
were not different from those towards baseline subjects.
Hence, although the sign of the coefficients in the regressions points to a negative
effect, there is no statistical significant evidence that the singled out individual was
trusted less than other individuals (i.e. Conjecture 1 does not hold with respect to
trust).
Table 7 In the regressions on the return rate to singled out subjects, all the treatment
dummies in regression 7 are negative, though only the coefficient on RS+ABS is sta-
tistically significant (p < 0.001). An F test restricting all the dummies corresponding
to treatments where the singled out can be identified (BS, GS, RS, ABS) to 0 is rejected
(p < 0.01). In addition, the Asterisk dummy of regression 7 is statistically significant
(p < 0.01).
Result 6 Subjects who were not responsible of the distinct status of the singled out
subject returned about 20 % less to this person.
This result provides strong evidence in favor of Conjecture 3 with respect to trust-
worthiness.
In all the regressions, we control for demographic and psychological variables, and
some of them turned out to be statistically significant.28
6 Discussion
Our experiment was the first to look at singling out in an economic setting and was
run under a minimal and artificial manipulation. While obviously research with nat-
28 Most notably, participants with a background in economics gave less to both non-singled and singled
out subjects; a similar behavioral pattern is observed for Muslim subjects and Indian subjects; while single
participants gave and returned more to non-singled out subjects. Our psychological measures had limited
power to explain trust game behavior. First, the risk attitude of the subjects, as measured in the Holt and
Laury (2002) task, did not relate to trusting or trust fulfilling behavior, as already found in Tsutsui and
Zizzo (forthcoming), Lönnqvist et al. (2010), and Houser et al. (2010). Second, although self-esteem is a
key concept of social identity theory, our measure of self-esteem does not contribute to explain the behavior
in our trust game. Third, other than in relation to authorities as just remarked on, the social desirability scale
was unrelated to both trusting and trust fulfilling behavior. Since this measure is a proxy for experimenter
demand effects (see Zizzo and Fleming 2011), the fact that it does not correlate with trust or trustworthiness
in our experiment, and that our key results above are robust to controlling for it, inspires confidence for the
robustness of our results to potential experimenter demand effects. In the on-line appendix, we also analyze
the time trend of the key variables.
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ural group has merits, the artificial set-up is a good one to tackle a new area, reduces
potential confounding such as natural group stereotyping and minimizes any potential
experimenter demand effects. However, it is possible that stronger or less artificial
manipulations (e.g., associating a status of being singled out with a specific socio-
economic characteristic) may provide additional insights in the understanding of how
this social phenomenon works in the real world. Furthermore, we studied the impli-
cations of singling someone out in the specific setting of trust games. It is likely that
singling someone out also affects the standard results of other experimental environ-
ments of interest to within-firm cooperation, such as public goods games, weakest link
games and so on; it might also affect individual preferences for time or work produc-
tivity. This is why additional research should take place to confirm the robustness of
our results and further our understanding of the implications of singling out.
One potential explanation of our findings might be that there is not a behavior
change because of singling out. Rather, the singled out subjects may behave differ-
ently because individual characteristics information made them singled out (i.e., least
preferred or most preferred) and implies that they behaved differently. The focus here
is on individual characteristics information which was transmitted (e.g., age or PhD),
and which may make the sample of singled out subjects different from the sample of
non-singled out subjects. This individual characteristics hypothesis is within the realm
of possibility in the least preferred and most preferred singled out subjects treatments
precisely because the choice of such least preferred and most preferred singled out
subjects may be non-random, as information is provided to subjects to choose their
ranking of subjects they would wish to be matched with.29 We are able to control for
this hypothesis in three complementary ways. First, in Sect. 3, we provided evidence
on how the behavior of the least or most preferred matches in the B subjects, who
were not singled out, was different from that of the least and most preferred matches
in BS/PIBS and GS/PIGS treatments respectively, who were singled out. Specifically,
the behavioral patterns identified by Results 2 and 3—such as the lower trustworthi-
ness of singled out subjects—were not replicated by looking at least/most preferred
matches in the B subjects. This implies that the act of singling out as opposed to the
individual characteristics making a subject least or most preferred determined those
results. Second, we control directly for various individual characteristics in the regres-
sion analysis presented in Tables 4 and 5, thus enabling us to identify the effects of
singling out as separate to that of being a singled out subject. Third, and more funda-
mentally, the online appendix (section E) shows that the sample of singled out subjects
does not differ from the sample of corresponding non-singled out subjects in almost all
of the individual characteristics. As shown in the online appendix, PhD students were
more likely to be least preferred, but the PhD dummy is statistically insignificant in
29 A reviewer suggested that non-singled out subjects might have formed correct beliefs about the trust-
worthiness of the singled out subject and this, in turn, explains trusters’ propensity to trust. The only results
we have in the paper regarding giving rates are Results 1 and 5, both of which are non-significance results.
We cannot entirely rule out that, if this potential confound were taken into account, it would lead to greater
significance of singling out for trust than we have found. The reason we did not elicit belief is because,
in a first experiment, we wished to rule out the potential effect that eliciting belief may have had on later
behavior (e.g., Croson 2000). However, we note that Results 2 and 4 imply that trusters with correct beliefs
should have been less trusting of singled-out least preferred trustees, which is not what we find.
123
What happens if you single out? An experiment
all regressions in Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7, implying that it made no difference.30 Equally,
UK subjects were more likely to be most preferred matches (see online appendix),
but the UK dummy is again statistically insignificant in Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7, implying
that they did not behave any differently from everyone else. Finally, single subjects
were less likely to be most preferred matches, and what we find is that they were more
trusting and trustworthy towards non-singled out subjects according to Tables 4 and
5. However, we have not found any evidence that high status subjects (i.e., the most
preferred matches) are less trusting and trustworthy towards non-singled out subjects,
and so this potential individual characteristic effect does not turn out to be relevant. It
is, of course, anyway controlled for in the regression analysis.
As we can rule out the individual characteristics hypothesis as an explanation of
our results, we conclude that singling out appears to matter as such. Insofar as we
could glean from our experiment, we found no evidence suggesting that singling out
is beneficial, at least with respect to trust or trustworthiness. We found it is irrelevant
for trust and potentially disruptive for trustworthiness.
Trustworthiness of non-singled out subjects towards singled out subjects. In line
with Conjecture 1, we found an overall reduction of trustworthiness of non-singled out
subjects towards singled out subjects, and one largely focused on the RS and the ABS
treatments. In these treatments, subjects returned around 20 % less to the singled out
subject compared to the baseline (Result 6), and over twice as large an effect relative
to the other treatments. This effect holds even while controlling for covariates such as
behavioral reciprocity (based on how much trustees were given by trusters) and any
potential experimenter demand (as proxied by our social desirability scale measure).
Our interpretation is that, in RS and ABS, the responsibility of choosing the singled out
subject shifted to someone else, and, therefore, any concern for the singled out subject’s
condition was mitigated if not removed. Conversely, in the case of the other treatments,
such concern could be present, as subjects may have felt responsible for the singled out
subject, thus reducing the negative effect of perceiving the singled out individual as an
outsider. This interpretation is in line with a responsibility-alleviation effect (Charness
2000) identified in Conjecture 3. A second explanation, which is still linked with a
responsibility-alleviation argument, is that, in treatments such as BS, subjects might
have thought to have made mistakes in the selection process of the singled out subject,
and, therefore, did not want to take actions which could have harmed a “blameless”
person. In other words, here the responsibility is not to have consciously singled
someone out, but rather to have made mistakes in singling someone out.31
Trustworthiness of non-singled out subjects towards non-singled out subjects. 32 In
contrast to Conjecture 1, we found no evidence that singling out works as a bonding
30 Further evidence of the irrelevance of this variable for our findings on low status subjects (i.e. least pre-
ferred matches) is that the results of the regressions do not change if we drop the observations corresponding
to PhD students selected as the least preferred match (3 observations).
31 Note that people might be in general more careful in evaluating top ranked choices than lower ranked
choices (Hausman and Ruud 1987), and, therefore, commit increasing mistakes with the latter.
32 We obviously do not have a discussion of the trustworthiness of singled out subjects towards other
singled out subjects since there was a single singled out subject in each session, and so no other singled out
subject that each singled out subject could interact with.
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tool for other group members leading to greater in-group cooperation: relative to
the baseline, there is no significant increase in trustworthiness from non-singled out
subjects towards other non-singled out subjects. If anything, there is evidence the
presence of a singled out subject reduced return rates to non-singled out subjects,
notably (by around 10–11 %) in the treatments where the singled out subject was the
least preferred match (Result 4 and Table 5). There are different possible reasons for
this; we mention two. First, the presence of an a-prototypical member in the group
may jeopardize the distinctiveness of the in-group as far as the singled out subject is
not excluded from the group (Hogg et al. 2005). Second, non-singled out subjects may
blame other non-singled out subjects for some responsibility for the singling out of a
specific subject.
Trustworthiness of singled out subjects towards non-singled out subjects. It mat-
tered for singled out subjects whether they were singled out for being the least preferred
match or otherwise. In contrast to Conjecture 4 and in agreement with Conjecture 2,
return rates by least preferred matches strikingly decreased from the 24 % of the base-
line to single digits (4–7 %) as per Table 3. According to the regressions in Table 5, once
covariates are taken into account, subjects who were seen as least preferred matches
were less trustworthy by as much as 16 %. It was not the act of being marked as low sta-
tus that caused this reaction, since it occurred even in PIBS, when only least preferred
matches knew they were the least preferred, and they knew that this was the case. We
can also exclude the fact of being singled out as having such an effect per se, since
we do not find the same large effect outside BS and PIBS. Rather, it was the fact of
being considered by other subjects as undesirable that appears to have elicited the neg-
ative reaction. Many psychological studies show that people who have been excluded
appear to engage in anti-social behaviors (e.g. Twenge et al. 2001). Our manipulation
does not imply exclusion. Nevertheless, some of the underlying psychological forces
motivating excluded people to engage in self-defeating social behaviors might also
be the same that trigger the anti-social behavior of the singled out subject. Anger,
resentment, and reciprocity might be the driving forces of such retaliatory behavior.
Most preferred singled out matches, i.e. singled out subjects under a positive frame,
behaved bimodally, with either high or low return rates (Result 3 and Fig. 2). This result
supports at the same time both Conjectures 2 and 4. One interpretation of this result is
that it reflects some of the mixed results of the psychological research on leadership
theory. Highly prototypical subjects should display more distinct group behaviors,
and, therefore, more in-group favoritism (Hogg 2001). However, the status-based gap
between the highly prototypical subject and the rest of the group may transform an
intra-group relationship between the consensually liked subject and the others into an
inter-group relationship (Hogg 2001). Due to this, the singled out subject may behave
in a more anti-social way toward the lower status subjects. Our results suggest that
both behavioral patterns may describe the singled out subject’s decision whether to
fulfill trust. Which behavior turns out to happen probably depends on whether the most
preferred singled out individual perceives himself or herself as an insider or outsider.
Another interpretation of our bimodality finding is that it may also be explained
by the particular beliefs of most preferred matches, quite independently of group
identity concerns. The most preferred singled out subject might have believed to be
selected by others because of strategic reasons rather than niceness (i.e. he or she was
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considered the most exploitable subject in the groups), and, therefore, he or she might
have behaved antisocially in response to such attribution (in the spirit of McCabe et al.
2003). Alternatively, the fact that he or she is considered most preferred might support
a belief that trust is being placed on him or her, and that he or she should feel let down
if trust is not fulfilled; this would lead to more pro-social behavior (e.g., Dufwenberg
and Gneezy 2000; Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007). Our design does not allow us
to disentangle these alternative explanations, and it would therefore be worthwhile to
investigate this in further research.
Trustworthiness of authorities towards non-singled out subjects.33 ABS treatment
authorities had a return rate of just around 7–8 %. The reduction in trustworthiness
is moderated by experimenter and social demand: subjects more sensitive to social
pressure such as experimenter demand return comparatively more, as shown by the
significance of SDS17 × Authority in the Table 5 regressions. Nevertheless, Table 5
also shows that the effect persists when controlling for our social desirability scale
measure that we employ to control for experimenter demand.
We should point out that the aim of our experiment was not to study the behavior
of the authority. We simply wanted to investigate the effects of singling out when
a specific individual rather than the entire group is responsible for the lower-status
attribution. Different conjectures might explain why the authority did not fulfill trust.
We mention two. First, authorities might have felt that, since their co-participants had
been assessed as comparatively worthy matches, they should be more generous in their
giving. Second, they may have felt entitled to keep more money because he or she had
already a service to everyone else by helping identify the least preferred match.
Our starting point was the fact that singling out is a pervasive phenomenon of
economic and social life. We found that singling out individuals does not carry any
benefit in terms of trust and has a negative effect for trustworthiness. Obviously, further
research is needed and singling out may yet have benefits for organizations—if, for
example, it is connected to social rewards and therefore can be used to elicit greater
work productivity. However, if you are a manager and you are considering singling out
someone for blame and praise, you may wish to bear in mind that this, and especially
the former, may disrupt the social glue holding the team together.
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